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Abstract
Horizontal IaaS federation exploits datacenter for federation of IaaS provider by supplying virtual nodes (e.g. virtual
machines, virtual switches, and virtual routers) and virtual links. Today’s datacenters for cloud computing do not
supply full network virtualization in terms of user-level network management and user-agreed network topology.
The datacenters lack the basic security services required for the collocation of tenants’ virtual networks. The network
virtualization research projects from academia and industry support full network virtualization but lack the basic
security services required for the collocation of tenants’ virtual networks. This paper investigates the security issues in
four areas namely, (a) monolithic IaaS cloud, (b) network virtualization research projects, (c) datacenter network
virtualization and (d) virtual resources to incorporate full network virtualization environment in horizontal IaaS
federation. Further, it presents the security related qualitative comparisons of datacenters, network virtualization
research projects and virtual resources to incorporate full network virtualization in horizontal IaaS federation.
Keywords: Cloud computing; Security; Horizontal federation; IaaS
Introduction
The development of cloud computing as conjectured by
Celesti et al. [1] is divided into three stages: i) monolithic
cloud, ii) vertical federation, and iii) horizontal federa-
tion. In the first stage, the full-fledged cloud services are
provided by the cloud provider. All the services are pro-
prietary and hence all the granular services (e.g. a storage
service, computing service etc.) needs to be taken from a
single cloud provider. In the vertical federation, most of
the cloud providers leverage cloud services from another
provider. Currently, the second stage is in transition. The
future stage will be the horizontal IaaS federation where
cloud providers federate to borrow virtual resources (e.g.
virtual machines, virtual nodes and virtual links) from
another cloud provider to gain economics of scale. The
cloud federation may be economically profitable, since
the datacenter utilization is only 5% to 20% of its peak
time [2]. This under-utilization can be used by another
cloud provider in the federation. The cloud federation also
solves the problem of service provider lock-in, unavail-
ability of the particular service provider, heterogeneous
environment unavailability etc. [3].
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The monolithic IaaS cloud has three limitations namely
(a) maximumnumber of VLANs are limited to 4K because
of 12 bits VLAN ID in 802.1Q Ethernet Header [4], (b)
no user-agreed network topology at granular level config-
ured and (c) the router gives connectivity between clouds
(i.e. a single route table is used to manage all networks of
a user), or cloud and the Internet. We will use the term
minimal network virtualization for the three aforemen-
tioned limitations in the monolithic IaaS cloud. The IBM’s
TVDc is an example of vertical federation which sup-
ports minimal network virtualization [5,6]. In contrast to
the minimal network virtualization, the full network vir-
tualization is an environment in which the connectivity
of virtual machines is provided using instances of physi-
cal network components (e.g. router and switch). It also
will facilitate transparent network management of vir-
tual network at a granular level (i.e. virtual switch, virtual
router etc.).
Informally, the horizontal IaaS federation provides a
federated IaaS cloud service of virtual servers using full
network virtualization out of the datacenter. The trans-
parent network virtualization in horizontal IaaS federa-
tion facilitates the network isolation, flexibility in network
management, user-level network policy control [7] along
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with the advantages of cloud federation mentioned ear-
lier. The full network virtualization in horizontal IaaS
federation also provides separation of duties (infrastruc-
ture provider and service provider etc.), inter-operability
between network owners, and portability. Few topology-
aware scientific and commercial applications which can be
deployed in horizontal IaaS federation are explored in [8]
and [9].
There are two major challenges in the development of
horizontal IaaS federation. First, the datacenters and vir-
tual resources lack full network virtualization required for
the horizontal IaaS federation. The second obstacle in the
development is the lack of security provision required for
the collocation of tenants’ virtual networks on the dat-
acenter. The obstacles demand analysis of the existing
network virtualization technologies in different domains
for security provision.
In this paper, we have investigated potential areas of
network virtualization environment (NVE): a) generic
network virtualization, b) the datacenter network virtu-
alization, c) network virtualization in monolithic cloud
and d) network virtualization in virtual resources. We
use the term generic network virtualization to denote the
research projects for testing future generation networks
from academia and industry. First, we give a qualita-
tive comparison of monolithic cloud designs, datacen-
ters, network virtualization projects and virtual resources
related to security issues. We also give limitations of
aforesaid areas to incorporate full network virtualization
and security services required for horizontal IaaS federa-
tion. Finally, an insight in research directions on security
issues is given for the development of horizontal IaaS
federation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We
first formally re-define horizontal IaaS federation for
the inclusion of full server and network virtualization
in Section ‘Horizontal IaaS federation’. A hypothetical
example of horizontal IaaS federation is also given in
Section ‘Horizontal IaaS federation’ to illustrate the rea-
sons for the investigation of network virtualization secu-
rity. Section ‘Horizontal IaaS federation security issues’
explores the domains for security of horizontal IaaS fed-
eration and also gives a list of security requirements for
horizontal IaaS federation. Section ‘Monolithic IaaS NVE
security’ presents NVE security issues of monolithic cloud
and vertical federation. Section ‘Datacenter NVE secu-
rity’ and ‘Generic NVE security’ give security issues of
datacenter and generic NVE respectively. The security
issues of virtual resources related to NVE are presented
in Section ‘Virtual resources security’. Finally, a discus-
sion on research directions for security in horizontal
IaaS federation and concluding remarks are presented in
Section ‘Research directions’ and Section ‘Conclusions’
respectively.
Horizontal IaaS federation
In horizontal IaaS federation, the service provider gives
service to another cloud called home cloud, and the service
borrower takes service from another cloud called foreign
cloud. The home cloud borrows virtual resources from the
foreign cloud either because of virtualization infrastruc-
ture saturation in home cloud, or the economics of scale
in cloud federation [10]. The three-phase cross federa-
tion [1,10] and mobile-agent based cloud federation [3]
are examples of the horizontal IaaS federation in which
a home cloud rents virtual machines from foreign clouds
without considering full network virtualization.
The horizontal IaaS federation should provide full
network virtualization to its clients to gain advantages
mentioned earlier. The existing work on horizontal IaaS
federation [1,3,10] incorporates full server virtualization
and minimal network virtualization while the application
of network virtualization in various domains [11,12] con-
centrates on one of the two virtualizations. So, we first
investigate the roles in the full server and network virtual-
ization; and then formally re-define it for the inclusion of
full server and network virtualization.
The network virtualization supports existence of multi-
ple virtual network infrastructures on the top of physical
network infrastructure. The NVE has two roles: service
provider (SeP) and infrastructure provider (InP). The InP
owns physical infrastructure and SeP borrows/owns vir-
tual infrastructure. Figure 1 shows an example of net-
work virtualization environment. The network topology
in plain line rectangle shows the physical infrastruc-
ture of InP. The network topologies in single-dot-dash
and double-dot-dash line rectangles shows the virtual
resources of SePs. The virtual nodes are installed on the
physical resources. e.g. the virtual nodes, K1 and K2 are
installed on the physical node K. The virtual link may be
mapped to any path reachable between two nodes by some
virtual network placement algorithm.
Figure 1 Network virtualization. The figure gives definition of
network virtualization.
Nimkar and Ghosh Journal of Cloud Computing: Advances, Systems and Applications 2013, 2:19 Page 3 of 13
http://www.journalofcloudcomputing.com/content/2/1/19
The current horizontal IaaS federation ecosystem has
three key components: Cloud coordinators, Brokers, and
an Exchange [13]. The cloud coordinators handle the dat-
acenters for exporting market-based cloud services. A
cloud coordinator can be cloud provider or consumer in
the federation. A Cloud Broker is a mediator between
cloud providers and cloud consumers for the federation.
A cloud exchange performs match making services for the
cloud users.
The horizontal IaaS federation with full server and net-
work virtualization must consider at least two roles (viz.
network service provider and infrastructure provider)
from network virtualization and three roles (viz. a cloud
provider, cloud consumer and a broker) from the current
horizontal IaaS federation ecosystem. So the horizontal
IaaS federation ecosystemmust have four roles namely ser-
vice provider (SeP), infrastructure provider (InP), broker
(Br) and user to incorporate full network virtualization.
The horizontal IaaS federation can be formally defined as:
Definition: horizontal IaaS federation The federated
cloud service of virtual infrastructures of a set of vir-
tual nodes (e.g. virtual switches, virtual routers), virtual
links and virtual machines from a set of InPs (a virtual
network infrastructure provider) and SePs (a IaaS cloud
service provider) with transparent full server and network
virtualization.
We will use the term federation to mean horizontal IaaS
federation for the sake of brevity from now onward in
the paper. We illustrate this definition with the following
example. The hypothetical example presented in Figure 2
is inspired by the theoretical development of federation
in InterCloud [13] and open-flow based network virtual-
ization for cloud [14]. The IaaS cloud provider can be
Figure 2 Horizontal IaaS federation. The figure shows an example
of horizontal IaaS federation and boundary of security control.
InP, or InP as well as SeP in the federation as shown in
Figure 2. The figure shows a federation of three IaaS cloud
providers ({InP-1, SeP-1}, {InP-2} and {SeP-3, InP-3}) and
three users (User-1, User-2 and User-3). The plain-line
rectangles are InP providers. The bottom topologies of
plain-line rectangles are physical infrastructure of the
InPs. The home cloud {InP-1, SeP-1} has a cloud user,
User-1. The home cloud {InP-3, SeP-3} has two cloud
users, User-2 and User-3. The home cloud {InP-1, SeP-1}
provides a virtual network {VN-A,VN-F} by borrowing
a virtual network {VN-F} from foreign cloud {InP-3} to
User-1. The home cloud {InP-3,SeP-3} provides virtual
networks {VN-C,VN-D,VN-G} and {VN-B,VN-E} by bor-
rowing the virtual networks {VN-C,VN-D} and {VN-B} to
User-3 and User-2 respectively. The virtual machines are
not shown in Figure 2 as the present work is concerned
about virtual network infrastructure.
The virtual nodes and links are created by their respec-
tive InPs on receiving request from SePs. The virtual
resources are managed by the users of SePs. The double-
dot-dash and single-dot-dash line polygons show the
boundary of SeP-1 and SeP-2 control respectively. The
management of virtual resources is done by their respec-
tive users. In a nutshell, the various functions like vir-
tual resource management, control and configuration are
cooperatively performed by the three roles of the federa-
tion, so it is necessary to consider various security issues
for proper functioning of the federation.
Horizontal IaaS federation security issues
To incorporate full network virtualization in federation
ecosystem, the security issues of all constituents in the
ecosystem must be investigated. The two components,
Brokers and an Exchange out of three components of
federation system are very similar to any brokered archi-
tecture [13] where the service/resources are leased using
some kind of negotiation between service consumer and
provider through the Brokers and an Exchange. So, the
investigation of these two components are omitted.
Vaquero et al. [15] surveyed monolithic IaaS security
issues related to virtual machines but it did not address
the security issues related to network virtualization. In
[7,11], the authors investigated generic network virtualiza-
tion without security concerns. Bari et al. [12] reported
the survey of datacenter network virtualization with-
out security issues. In a nutshell, none of the existing
work have concentrated on the security issues in net-
work virtualization environment. We mainly focus on
NVE security issues in monolithic IaaS cloud (Section
‘Monolithic IaaS NVE security’), datacenter network
(Section ‘Datacenter NVE security’), generic network vir-
tualization (Section ‘Generic NVE security’) and virtual
resources (Section ‘Virtual resources security’) to incorpo-
rate full network virtualization in the federation.
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A detailed discussion on the security requirements of
federation ecosystem is beyond the scope of current inves-
tigation. A few security requirements of the federation are
already explored in the constituents of federation ecosys-
tem in the literature: (a) cloud security requirements [16],
(b) network virtualization security requirements [17], (c)
cloud security alliance V3.0 [18], and (d) web security sur-
vey [19]. So we use following security requirements which
are derived and extended from the literature [16-19].
• R1 - Layered network architecture in which physical
resources are controlled by InPs and virtual resources
are transparently controlled by SePs.
• R2 - Provide transparent view of virtual network
infrastructure with a clear SLA (service level
agreement) between SePs, InPs and cloud users.
• R3 - Autonomous local identity management for
physical resources used by InP.
• R4 - Cooperative global identity management for
virtual resources used by SeP and cloud users.
• R5 - A brokered architecture between Br, InPs, SePs
and cloud users for the collaboration of local and
global identity management.
• R6 - An access control mechanism to create, destroy
virtual resources out of physical resources after the
negotiation between InPs, SePs and cloud users.
• R7 - An access control mechanism to manage and
use virtual resources as per SLA between InPs, SePs
and cloud users.
• R8 - Intra-InP routing protocol with source
authentication, operational confidentiality for cloud
users within a InP.
• R9 - Inter-InP routing protocol with source
authentication, operational confidentiality and least
information disclosure among InPs.
• R10 - Tight collaboration among SePs and InPs in
terms of fault handling, configuration, accounting,
performance monitoring, trust negotiation and QoS.
Monolithic IaaS NVE security
As monolithic IaaS clouds are proprietary and a few tech-
nical documents are publicly available, so only two designs
have been selected for the investigation of NVE secu-
rity. Amazon Elastic Cloud 2 (EC2) [20-22] and GoGrid
[23] are the representatives of the most popular and a
randomly selected IaaS cloud provider respectively.
The first representative, EC2 provides minimal network
virtualization using either a software or hardware gate-
way to facilitate the communication between VPCs or
virtual machines. A software gateway uses route tables as
software virtual router while hardware gateway uses hard-
ware router. Cisco integrated service routers and Juniper
J-series are examples of software virtual routers. RTX
3000 is an example of hardware router. The EC2 uses
security groups to provide the basic security services
among the users. A security group acts as a virtual firewall
to control the traffic allowed that is allowed into a group
of virtual machines instances.
The second representative, GoGrid offers limited net-
work service using a private switch to each private cloud.
GoGrid also makes use of hardware firewall to protect the
servers of private clouds. Xu et al. [24] proposed secured
wide area network virtualization for virtual private cloud
using tunnelling.
Datacenter NVE security
Cloud computing exploits datacenter for the provision of
large data storage and network services with highly redun-
dant data network and backup power supplies. We have
thoroughly gone through the literature to find the limita-
tion of NVE and its security services in the datacenters.
The main aim of NVE provided in current datacenter is
high utilization of its resources and not for any kind of net-
work virtualization provision to its user. Md Faizaul Bari
et al. [12] reported the survey of datacenter network virtu-
alization without any security features. The first four dat-
acenters (i.e., CloudNAS, Diverter, VICTOR and SEC2)
provide security services in terms of security components
and security implementations as shown in Table 1. The
security implementation can be tunnelling, anti-spoofing,
policy enforcement and visibility filters. The security com-
ponents can be FE (Fowarding Element), CC (Central
Controller), DPI or IDS. The CloudNAS supports full
network virtualization but optional confidentiality and
authentication using tunnelling.
The Diverter provisions network virtualization on the
top of customized layer-3 network addressing. Each host
has triplet 〈f:s:h〉 address where f is farm of hosts, s is
subnet identifier and h is a particular host. The layer-
3 triplet addresses are transparent to the tenants. Each
host also runs VNET as distributed router in OS kernel-
space. The VNET implements anti-spoofing and visibility
filters to provide security services to tenants. The anti-
spoofing filter prevents a VM impersonation by another
VM. The visibility filter contains all network visibility
rules to enforce separation between virtual machines. The
tenants can use optional tunnelling for confidentiality.
The SEC2 and VICTOR have some common features.
The network infrastructure of SEC2 as well as VICTOR is
organized in two levels: a core domain and edge domains.
An edge domain consists of physical hosts and switches.
The core domain is made of a set of customized layer
2 switch called as Forwarding Element (FE) and Cen-
tral Controller (CC). Central Controller (CC) controls the
operation of FEs. FE performs two functions namely, (a)
address lookup and mapping and (b) policy enforcement.
The security service of SEC2 is made available through
tunnelling or FEs. FEs can implement firewalls, NAT and
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Table 1 Datacenter network virtualization security
Datacenter Features Security components Network virtualization Security implementation
CloudNAS [25] Network Middlebox (Deep Full NVE Optional tunnelling
Specification Packet Insepction
and embedding - DPI or IDS)
Diverter [26] Multi-tenant VNET Layer-3 distributed Anti-spoofing and
virtual networks virtual routing visibility filters
VICTOR [27] Dynamic VM migration FE and CC Set of distributed FEs Policy enforcement
SEC2 [4] Multi-tenancy network isolation FE and CC Set of distributed FEs Policy enforcement,
VPLS and MPLS
Gatekeeper [28] Bandwidth performance isolation - Set of vNIC -
NetShare [29] Bandwidth guarantees and - Topology-driven -
high utilization
NetLord [30] Flexible network abstraction - L2 and L3 encapsulation -
Oktopus [31] Virtual network - Assumption - physical -
abstractions mapping to virtual and
provision oversubscribed cluster
PortLand [32] VM migration, automatic - L2 switching using -
switch configuration - hierarchical Pseudo MAC
SPAIN [33] Multipath forwarding - Datacenter topology-driven -
VL2 [34] Performance isolation - AA(Application) and -
LA(Local) addressing
middleboxes. The remaining seven datacenters propos-
als have different aims but do not provide any security
features as summarized in Table 1.
Generic NVE security
The existence of virtual network on the top of physi-
cal network may appear at any layers of OSI reference
model. Consequently, there are mainly four types of net-
work virtualization: (a) virtual local area network (VLAN),
(b) virtual private network (VPN), (c) active and pro-
grammable network, and (d) overlay networks [11]. Some
of the surveyed network virtualization projects using
aforementioned types are not useful for the investigation
of security issues. So we used three filtering criteria for
the survey. The first, VLAN and VPN inherently pro-
vides security features to network virtualization environ-
ment using segmentation, isolation, tunnelling, IPSec and
VLAN. Second, the main aim of some network virtual-
ization projects (e.g. AKARI, CABO, 4WARD, Triology,
and Clean-slate) is the design of next generation net-
work. They are long-term projects; and are evolving and
extending from another network virtualization projects
like GENI and VINI. Third, the research in old network
virtualization projects namely Genesis (is from Active and
programmable network type) has been stopped. So the
network virtualization projects for security investigation
after applying the three filtering criteria are GENI, Planet-
Lab, UCLP, VINI and X-bone.
As per the security requirements of full network
virtualization in federation given in Section ‘Horizontal
IaaS federation’, we surveyed the network virtualization
projects by classifying them under five categories: (a)
identitymanagement for resources, (b) authentication and
trust management, (c) resource access control, (d) routing
security issues; and (e) other security issues.
Identity management for resources
The digital identities for virtual resources in network
virtualization environment give a provision of dynamic
connectivity between virtual resources. An identity man-
agement for resources in network virtualization provides
mechanisms for managing and gaining access to the
resource’s identity and information across organizational
boundaries to SePs and InPs. Yuan et al. [35] classified
the identity management models in three categories —
isolated, centralized and federated — by considering var-
ious attributes. We will consider only four attributes —
the number of InPs, the number of SeP, user control over
identity, and identities’ storage — as per the require-
ments, R4 and R5. Table 2 shows the comparison of
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Table 2 Identity management for resources: comparison
Project No. of InPs No. of SePs User control Identity storage
GENI [36] Many One Yes Decentralized
PlanetLab [37] Many One Yes Centralized
UCLP [38] Many Many No Decentralized
X-bone [39] One One No Centralized
NouVeau [40] Many Many - Decentralized
GENI, PlanetLab, UCLP, X-Bone and NouVeau using four
attributes mentioned earlier. The roles from the projects
are mapped to InP, SeP and cloud user so that it is easier
to compare the projects.
The GENI have InPs (called as Aggregates) and SePs
(called as research organizations). The users of research
organization (i.e., SeP users) are called principal. The prin-
cipal may be a researcher, principal investigator (which
is an administrator) and slice admin. The virtual network
instance is called slice and consists of objects. The GENI
defines identifiers called GENI Global Identifiers (GGID)
for all principal and objects in the system. The GENI uses
X.509 certificate to represent GGID for authentication. In
federated GENI system, an identity of an object in SeP
is a union of identities stored across multiple InPs. The
database of identity name-space is stored at the research
organization’s site and allows control by the principal.
The PlanetLab has three main roles: an owner, a user
and PLC (PlanetLab Consortium). The owner (i.e., InP)
supply physical nodes to create VMs. A service is installed
on PlanetLab by a researcher (i.e., SeP). The PLC is a cen-
tralized entity and has mainly two functions: (a) manages
physical resource and (b) maintains trust among own-
ers and researchers. A slice is a collection of VMs. Each
slice is uniquely identified by the hierarchical name where
each level has the responsibility to manage and control the
resources at that level. The PLC acts as slice authority and
maintains state of all slices in the system.
The UCLP is the most promising project for federation
in which the identities of virtual resources (e.g. LightPath,
End2End object) is managed by UCLP Admins (SePs) and
the identities of physical resources are managed by net-
work owners (InPs). The UCLP end users cannot control
UCLP virtual resources. The UCLP uses decentralized
JavaSpace storage for the identities at InPs’ sites. The over-
lay manager (SeP as well as InP) in X-bone manages the
identity of virtual nodes at central repository. The X-bone
user cannot control the identity of the virtual resources.
The NouVeau is an identity management for a abstract
network virtualization model and is similar to UCLP. It is
based on three main principles: separation of identity and
location, local autonomy, and global identifier space. It
also requires special entities called controller and adapters
for the managements of identities in SePs and InPs.
Authentication and trust management
A typical identity management has any of the three types
of trust relationship between the service provider (SP)
and identity provider (IdP) - pairwise, brokered and com-
munity trust models [41,42]. In network virtualization,
SeP or InP may play a role as IdP and SP. The identity
management may have any of the three trust relation-
ships between SePs and/or InPs in network virtualization
depending on the number of InPs and SePs. The Planet-
Lab, UCLP and X-bone uses PKI infrastructure (i.e., com-
munity trust) for authentication and trust management
between SePs and InPs.
GENI uses a brokered trust model in which four entities
namely clearinghouse, aggregates, research organization
and researcher form a bilateral automatic trust negotia-
tion [43-45] between them. The GENI is a decentralized
system in which most of the times, a requester may not
be from the same security domain (InP) for the authoriza-
tion of resources. So, it uses attribute-based access control
(ABAC) in which a request may be granted based on the
characteristic of the requester’s attributes. The negotia-
tor contacts access mediator (i.e., GENI clearinghouse) to
start bilateral negotiation (i.e., automatic trust negotia-
tion). The negotiation is a sequence of credential exchange
starting from non-sensitive credentials between negotia-
tors. After successful negotiation, the request is granted to
access the resource.
Resource access control
The authorization decision of an entity in a closed and
open system about the resources is treated differently. So
we divide the access control mechanism in two parts: local
access control for a closed system and a global access
control for the open system. The local access control per-
forms the local authorization decision about the physical
resources. The global access control performs the autho-
rization decision of distributed virtual resources. We will
compare three projects from academics and industry to
know the status of resource access control in the net-
work virtualization environment. Table 3 shows the access
control mechanism used by the different projects.
The network slices of GENI are created out of physi-
cal network of aggregates. The aggregates are strangers
to each other, so the GENI uses ABAC in which
automatic trust negotiation is performed by exchanging
Table 3 Resource access control for network virtualization
projects
Project Physical resources Virtual resources
GENI [36] - ABAC [43]
UCLP [38,46] Switch management MAC & DAC
X-bone [39] ACL ACL
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sensitive credentials. ABAC authorizes the access to vir-
tual resources using attribute acknowledgement (ACK)
policies and trust-target graph (TTG) protocol. The ACK
policy and TTG protocol perform attribute disclosure
and resource access decisions respectively using directed
graph.
The UCLP satisfies some requirements of R6 and R7
for physical and virtual network resources. The resource
access control for UCLP physical resources is either
implemented in the UCLP system, or an intermedi-
ate system between the UCLP and switch management.
The UCLP system may use mandatory access control
(MAC) or discretionary access control (DAC) for UCLP
virtual resources. The UCLP supports three approaches
for access control of UCLP virtual resources. The three
approaches are traditional DAC, generic authorization-
based distributed DAC and attributed-based distributed
DAC. The first method performs all the evaluation of
access and enforcement of policy in a centralized manner.
The second method stores authorization information in
different domains and performs the authorization process
in multiple domains. The third method uses certificate-
based system for authorization. The traditional DAC
cannot make authorization of users in other domains.
The second method is difficult to realize while the third
approach is the easiest to implement.
X-bone system uses very simple access control mecha-
nism for the authorization using ACL (access control list).
It maintains the list of permission on the virtual resources
for each user in the system. X-bone first checks the ACL
for applicable entry to decide whether the requested oper-
ation is authorized based on subject and object identities.
Routing security issues
The user’s virtual infrastructure of the SeP may be
installed on an InP or a set of InPs in the federation.
Similarly, the InP also collocates virtual networks from
different SePs. The nature of the routing protocol used
within InP and among InPs are totally different as per the
security requirements, R8 and R9. The routing protocol
within InP for a set of SePs must provide hop integrity,
origin authentication and path validation. The first three
parameters are necessary for users’ collocation of virtual
networks in a InP. The fourth parameter provides least
information disclosure and operational confidentiality of
the virtual network installed on multiple InPs. The hop
integrity of a routing protocol refers to the confidentiality
between peers. The origin authentication is the authen-
tication of a router. The path validation refers to the
validity and authenticity of a received topological path.
The number of tenants affects information leakage on the
same physical network infrastructure. The routing proto-
col among InPs must provide control over the information
disclosure and routing basis. The routing basis shows the
significance of name-space and/or identity used in the
routing protocol. Table 4 shows the comparison of rout-
ing protocols for all the parameters mentioned above. We
have mainly focussed our investigation on the protocols
which gives some security features and upcoming virtual
network routing.
The three variants of BGP namely S-BGP, IRV, and So-
BGP provide security services in terms of - PKI, address
attestation (a statement of delegation of identity), a spe-
cial SECURITY message, or IRV–Identity Request Server
with no provision for information disclosure. The min-
imum disclosure routing (MDR), routing on flat label
(ROFL) and secure virtual trust routing (SVTR) are the
upcoming routing protocols for virtual network in the
field of federation. The MDR gives the minimum disclo-
sure and operational confidentiality through the extension
of Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC). The SMC
reveals secret information among multiple parties using
their individual secrets. The nodes of ROFL routing guar-
antees origin authentication and path validation using
self-certification and access control mechanism respec-
tively. SVTR is the only protocol that gives provision for
multi-tenant collocation using hop integrity.
Basic security services
The network virtualization projects have components to
perform the specific functions related to either manage-
ment or security services. Any data traffic — plain or
protocol related— transferred in the projects may provide
basic security services like authentication, confidentiality
etc. Table 5 shows the data traffic among the compo-
nent(s) and/or resource(s) of the projects. We will use the
convention - “Authentication | Confidentiality | Protocol”
for brevity to describe the basic security services. The val-
ues for the convention are: A for Authentication, S for
Confidentiality, ∼ for negation, * for all available proto-
cols for data transmission. The communication between
the components of GENI, PlanetLab and UCLP is secured
and authenticated while X-bone does not use authenti-
cated communication. All projects do not provide secured
communication between the resources while GENI pro-
vides authenticated data transfer between them. X-bone
does not provide authenticated communication between
resources and components while all other projects pro-
vide authenticated communication. All projects provide
secured data transfer either optional or compulsory.
Virtual resources security
The virtual resources for network virtualization in mono-
lithic cloud are fully or partially implemented as soft-
ware. We specifically focussed on virtual resources
namely virtual routers, virtual switches and virtual links.
Sections ‘Virtual routers’, ‘Virtual switches’, ‘Virtual links’
and ‘Virtual resource migration’ gives the detailed survey
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Table 4 Routing security issues for horizontal IaaS federation
Routing protocol Hop integrity Origin authentication Path validation Information disclosure Routing basis No. of tenants
MDR [47] IPSec - - YES (SMC) Location & identity Single
ROFL [48] - Self certification ACM - Flat-label Single
SVTR [49] Secured - - NO (Privacy of attributes) Flow-level Multiple
S-BGP [50] PKI Address attestation Address attestation - Location & identity Single
IRV [51] Secure transport Source attestation IRV server - Location & identity Single
So-BGP [52] SECURITY message SECURITY message SECURITY message - Location & identity Single
of virtual resources in monolithic IaaS cloud and generic
network virtualization.
Virtual routers
The virtualization of software routers called virtual soft-
ware routers exploits processing power out of physical
router or commodity hardware using NICs or NetFPGA.
Juniper’s intelligent logical router on the top of M-Series
and T-Series routers are examples of virtual software
routers [53]. The intelligent logical router supports cus-
tomized policy control, protocol assignment, configura-
tion but no on-the-fly configuration and administration.
It also does not support source authentication. Most of
virtual software routers from monolithic cloud including
Amazon EC2 use route tables. The route table maintains
network filtering policy and are managed by VPC network
administrator. The EC2 also uses security groups which
offer secured virtual network isolation among cloud users.
The router has two modules: control plane and data
plane. The control plane performs the function of rout-
ing and maintains routing table. The data plane performs
the function of packet forwarding. All the router archi-
tectures using the combination of data and control plane
proposed by Pisa et al. concentrates on performance in
terms of delay [54]. The VROOM [55,56] router archi-
tecture also concentrates on the performance in terms of
delay using control plane virtualization. Table 6 classifies
the literature in two areas. First six literatures give the
proposal of the router. The remaining gives the perfor-
mance evaluation of virtual software routers. It is found
that all virtual software routers provide physical or logi-
cal isolation to improve the performance but no specific
security services. Some software routers on commodity
hardware are implemented with general-purpose work-
stations [57-62]. The proposals for router design aim at
low-cost and moderate-performance solutions and have
no security provision.
Virtual switches
The virtual switches can be broadly divided into
hypervisor-based or hardware-based depending on the
location of the implementation of virtual switches. The
hypervisor-based virtual switches are typically written
entirely in software. The hardware-based virtual switch is
partly implemented on special hardware like NIC, NetF-
PGA etc. The basis of hypervisor-based virtual switch
is Open vSwitch [71]. Open vSwitch resides within the
management domain of hypervisor (e.g. Domain-0 in
Xen) and provides connectivity between virtual machines
and physical interfaces. Open vSwitch uses VLANs and
GRE tunnels for secured virtual network and virtual path
respectively. It also supports basic ACL.
Hardware-based virtual switch eliminates some limi-
tations (like CPU or memory usage) of software-based
virtual switch. Two hardware-based virtual switch imple-
mentations are Virtual Ethernet Port Aggregator (VEPA)
[72] and VNTag [73]. The Virtual Ethernet Port Aggre-
gator (VEPA) is a standardization led by HP Extreme,
IBM, Brocade and Juniper etc. The VEPA allows traf-
fic of VM to exit and re-enter the same port to enable
switching among VMs. The VEPA has MACSec scheme
to provision a secure connection between VEPA and
bridges.
Tseng et al. [74] proposed the integration of open-
source hypervisor with software-based virtual switch
and aims at secure network environment among VMs.
Table 5 Basic security services of network virtualization projects
Project Resource-Component Component-Component Resource-Resources
GENI [36] A | ∼S | SSL A | S | SSL A | ∼S | *
PlanetLab [37] A | S | SSL A | S | SSL ∼A | ∼S | *
UCLP [38] A | S | (SSL/JINI) A | S | (SSL & JINI) ∼A | ∼S | *
X-bone [39] ∼A | (S/∼S) | (UDP/UDP-S/TCP/TCP-SSL) ∼A | S | (UDP-S/TCP-SSL) ∼A | ∼S | *
* indicates all available protocols for data transmission.
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Table 6 Commodity and physical virtual routers’ control plane properties
Hardware type Virtualization type Control plane Performance Isolation Migration Flexibility
(Routing table)
Commodity-Intel IXP2400 [58] Pattern tables L3VR and L3/4VR × √ - √
Commodity-Click [63] Trie braiding Shared trie
√
- - -
Commodity-FPGA [64] Hybrid DS TCAM/SRAM -
√
- -




Commodity-NetFPGA [56] VROOM Software & hardware
√ √ √ √
Simulation [66] - Trie braiding - - × ×
Commodity [67] Container-based Guest OS Evaluation(OpenVZ,LinuxNamespace) - - -
(OpenVZ,LinuxNamespace)
Commodity [68] Hypervisor-based Guest OS Evaluation(SR,VSR) - - -
Commodity [69] Hypervisor-based Guest OS Evaluation(1,2,4 flows) - - -
Container-based Application
√ × × ×
Commodity [70] Hypervisor-based Guest OS
√ × × ×
Hypervisor-NIC mapping Guest OS
√ √ × ×
Hypervisor-Host OS Guest OS × √ √ √
× indicates the property doesn’t exist for the router.√
indicates the property exist for the router.
Luo et al. [75] proposed hardware-based virtual switch
using special NIC to provide network connectivity among
VMs in the datacenter.
Virtual links
The virtual links can be created using either signalling
protocol or encapsulation. The virtual link setup proto-
col (VLSP) is an example of signalling protocol to create
the virtual links. The encapsulation-based virtual link cre-
ation in the literature are Virtual Tunnel (VTun), Layer
Two Tunnelling Protocol - V3 (L2TPV3), Generic Routing
Encapsulation (GRE) and IP in IP Tunnelling (IIP).
Roland Bless et al. [76] proposed VLSP to create authen-
ticated and secured virtual link using NSIS authorization
[77] and secured signalling [78] protocols. It also pro-
vides QoS as per user’s requirement for link creation.
The L2TPV3 [79] encapsulation protocol creates tunnel
between nodes at layer 2. It does not inherently provide
authentication and encryption but IPSec can be used for
security provision. The VTun is a virtual link implemen-
tation over various kinds of tunnels (e.g. Ethernet, serial
tunnel, pipe tunnel) and; provides security services like
authentication, compression and encryption etc. [80]. The
GRE [81] encapsulation protocol is used to create a vir-
tual link between two nodes using an additional header
in the packet called delivery header without any security
features. The IIP [82] link creation protocol has a packet
format consisting of the outer header, security header,
original header and IP payload. The security header adds
optional security services using IPSec.
Virtual resource migration
As network virtualization is new emerging field, there is
few literature on some important field like the migration
of virtual router and link etc. Chen et al. uses VROOM
[56] router architecture to provide energy-saving IP-
WDM network architecture [83] by the process of virtual
router migration. All the router architecture proposals
and their migration methods using the combination of
data and control plane proposed by Pisa et al. concentrates
on performance in terms of delay [54]. The full virtual
networkmigration including virtual machines is proposed
by Keller et al [84]. All the literature concentrate on vir-
tual resource migration without any security concerns.
The virtual link migration suggested by Pisa et al does not
provide any security services.
Research directions
All domains surveyed in the paper lacks network virtu-
alization and/or its security provision. Most of network
virtualization projects are meant for scientific purpose
where the performance is major concern so the focus of
the projects are collocation of SePs’ networks on InPs’
physical network without any security concerns. Similarly,
datacenters do not exploit full network virtualization and
facilitates minimum security services in terms of VLAN
or VPN technology. The virtual resources lack very basic
level of security services. As a result of aforementioned
shortcomings, we will discuss NVE security issues for fed-
eration and give few research directions. The research
directions are classified as: (a) router architecture (b)
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datacenter NVE security, (c) resource identity manage-
ment, (d) resource access control and (e) intra-InP and
inter-InP routing.
Router architecture
All the router architectures using the combination of
data and control plane concentrates on performance in
terms of delay. The control plane as well as data plane
virtualization allows best-effort memory utilization but
may promote confidentiality threat due to the colloca-
tion of multiple SePs’ virtual routers on the same phys-
ical router. The software virtual routers on commodity
as well as physical router lacks source authentication,
remote configuration using SeP’s access control as shown
in Table 6. The source authentication, remote configura-
tion and access control mechanism are basic requirements
(R6-R10) to perform inter-InP and intra-InP routing by
the software virtual routers. By adding the above function-
ality, we pose few research questions like:What will be the
impact on router performance in terms of packet-delay?
What is the maximum number of tenants’ virtual soft-
ware routers that can coexist on a physical router without
degrading the performance? How the router virtualization
handles intra-InP and inter-InP routing by considering the
collocation of tenants’ virtual networks? How the virtual
router migration be handle by this architecture?
Datacenter NVE security
The most promising datacenter network virtualization
architecture for the federation is SEC2 [4] which supports
basic security services like source authentication, trans-
parent network management etc., but does not support
full network virtualization (requirements R1 and R2). The
network isolation among customers of CloudNAS can
be compromised if hypervisors, switches, or middleboxes
are compromised [4]. The customized devices like FEs
or CCs may expose MAC address of host and VM [30].
No datacenter supports federation of virtual resources
(requirement R10), full NVE (requirements R1-R2) and
resource access control (requirementsR6 andR7). All dat-
acenter network virtualization projects support minimum
security services using VLAN, L2/L3 addressing or spe-
cial routing devices (e.g. FE, CC etc.) as shown in Table 1.
The datacenter also do not permit transparent network
management (requirement R2), user-level policy control
and resource access control (requirements R6 and R7)
required for the federation.
Resource identity management
Table 2 shows that there is no identity management
which provides the feature of multiple InPs and SePs
(requirement R5), user’s control over identities (require-
ment R4) and decentralized storage. We used the generic
term user control to mean various operations on virtual
resources e.g., creation of virtual link, configuration of vir-
tual resource etc. The UCLP project shows some potential
towards the design of an identity management for feder-
ation but lacks users’ control over identities (requirement
R4). The federation requires federated identity manage-
ment, so a trust between InPs and/or SePs must be estab-
lished to gain the control over the requested resources
automatically on-the-fly. So, the federation needs the
identity management with automated trust negotiation
(requirement R10). We must also address the follow-
ing research question related to resource identity man-
agement: How to map heterogeneous address space of
resources in datacenters to local and global identity name-
space?
Resource access control
The trivial resource access control for horizontal IaaS
federation requires user-controlled access control mech-
anism (requirement R7) at virtual infrastructure and
mandatory access control (requirement R6) at physical
infrastructure. The GENI does not provide any kind of
resource access control over the physical resources while
virtual resources are managed in terms of Trust-Target
Graph protocol of ABAC (requirement R7). The UCLP
provisions MAC or DAC at virtual infrastructure level
but it does not fulfil the requirement at physical level.
X-bone uses ACL, a simplest access control manage-
ment of resources. Some research questions related to
resource access control are: Where should be the place-
ment of resource access controls in physical resources? If
the location of access control is in control plane of phys-
ical resource; and distributed among InPs and SePs, how
would they interact? What would be bandwidth-delay
product performance of physical as well as virtual network
infrastructures after deploying resource access controls?
Intra-InP and Inter-InP routing
Keller et al. [85] and Fukushima et al. [47] open up theoret-
ical research directions for intra-InP and inter-InP routing
respectively. The inter-InP routing should not disclose
routing information to InPs other than intended InPs
(i.e minimum disclosure) and also provide operational
confidentiality in routing process. MDR offers both min-
imum disclosure and operational confidentiality among
InPs but does not provide other properties mentioned
in Table 4. The intra-InP and inter-InP routing should
possess the security requirements, R6 and R7 with the
consideration of tenants’ virtual network collocation. We
pose the following research questions for routing process
in the federation by including aforementioned security
requirements: How the router maintains routing table
using intra-InP and inter-InP routing? How the informa-
tion (i.e., packets) of different virtual networks of cloud
users are separated? How the router will forward the
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packets of different virtual networks without exposing or
compromising?
Conclusions
With the motivation of adding full network virtualiz-
tion in horizontal IaaS federation, we investigated net-
work virtualization security in four areas: monolithic
IaaS cloud, generic network virtualization, datacenter net-
work virtualization and virtual resources. We presented
the qualitative comparisons of generic network virtualiza-
tion projects, datacenters, routing protocols and virtual
resources from aforementioned areas. Our qualitative
comparisons show the following important insights
related to network virtualization and security issues in
horizontal IaaS federation. The monolithic IaaS clouds do
not support full network virtualization but give minimal
network virtualization to offer the connectivity of virtual
networks or virtual machines. The simple security ser-
vices are offered in terms of VLAN, VPN or tunnelling
for the collocation of multiple tenants in monolithic IaaS
clouds. The datacenters lack both full network virtualiza-
tion and basic security services for the horizontal IaaS
federation. The network virtualization projects offer full
network virtualization but partial security provisions in
terms of one or more services of identity management,
resource access control and trust management. The router
architectures mostly focus on the performance of virtual
software routers and do not add any security features for
the collocation of tenants networks. The virtual switches
cannot have more than 4K VLANs. This paper shows
that the virtual links can be created using either signalling
protocol or encapsulation. The encapsulation-based vir-
tual link has an extra overhead of encapsulation on the
top of L2/L3 protocols but give hop integrity security
service. The signalling-based virtual link offers various
security services like origin authentication, hop integrity
and path validation. The research challenges mentioned
in Section ‘Research directions’ are crucial to the success
of horizontal IaaS federation in cloud computing.
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